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This study aims to explain why the Supreme Court responds to public mood by analyzing 
individual justice liberalism and comparing it to public liberalism between the years of 1953 and 
2005.  Three theories suggesting why the Court may respond to public opinion are discussed, 
including the replacement, political adjustment, and the attitude change hypotheses.  The 
argument of using Court reversals to determine the ideology of the Court is presented and 
implemented.  Public reaction to Court decisions is analyzed along with the Court’s institutional 
legitimacy as means to determine the Court’s strategic behavior.  Ideology, public mood, the 
parties controlling the House, Senate, and Presidency, and the overall Court mood are used as 
independent variables to explain the driving force behind changes in individual justices’ voting 
behavior.  The study concludes that Court mood is the strongest and most significant factor in 
changes in judicial voting behavior, while public opinion, ideology, and the parties controlling 
the other institutions of government explain little to none of the variance.  In addition to justice 
replacement, the aggregate attitude change of justices is determined to be the most likely 
explanation for the Court’s adherence to public opinion. 
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Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s role in American society is an essential part of the checks 
and balances of the United States government.  The lifetime tenure of justices frees them 
from the tyranny of public mood during election seasons and allows them to decide cases 
on the basis of the law rather than public preferences.  In Federalist Paper No. 78, 
Alexander Hamilton argued that if periodic instead of lifetime appointments were made, 
the temptation would be too great to consult popularity rather than the Constitution and 
the laws.  In Federalist Paper No. 76, Hamilton also described the Court as “the least 
dangerous branch” because of its inability to make laws and policies of its own.  It is also 
arguably the least democratic branch because it is the most independent branch.  
However, despite the Court’s immunity from public opinion, due to the process of 
appointments as opposed to elections, evidence suggests the Court still regularly decides 
in line with public opinion (Mishler & Sheehan, 1993, 1994, 1996; McGuire & Stimson, 
2004).  Given these data, public opinion has an influence on the Court, but due to the 
isolated and secretive nature of the institution, questions remain as to why public opinion 
holds sway over the Court’s decisions.  This study aims to fill a gap in previous research 
by examining individual justices’ relationship with the public and the other institutional 
actors of the government.   
Theories of Responsiveness 
 Three theories are used to explain how the Supreme Court might be affected by 
public opinion.  The Dahl-Funston hypothesis, also known as the “replacement 
hypothesis” posits that because the president and senators’ beliefs and positions are in 
line with the public mood when elected, their choices for justices are also likely to reflect 
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that mood. Dahl argues that a president generally gets to appoint two justices for every 
four years spent in office, which can effectively “tip the balance on the normally divided 
Court” (Dahl 1957 quoted in Mishler and Sheehan, 1996; p 171).  Mishler and Sheehan 
note that this theory is consistent with the attitudinal model of judicial decision making, 
which states that justices assume the bench with ideologies and beliefs that typically 
remain constant throughout their tenure (1996).  This provides a difficult hurdle for the 
replacement hypothesis to explain the Court’s adherence to public mood.  The attitudinal 
model does not exhibit itself in the history of the Court.  In studying individual justices, 
this research, along with others (Giles, Blackstone & Vining 2008; Mishler & Sheehan, 
1996; Epstein et al., 1998) shows that justices’ attitudes do change throughout their 
tenure.  As Mishler and Sheehan state, “it is an oversimplification of theory to hold that 
attitudes are the only or even necessarily the principal determinant of behavior” (1996; p. 
172).  Replacement certainly plays a role in the overall ideological change of the Court, 
but it is not a sufficient explanation for the Court’s adherence to public mood.  While it is 
directly observable, especially when justices are replaced by their ideological opposite, 
the replacement hypothesis fails to account for change that occurs during periods in 
which the Court is stable in its membership.  For this reason, and because some justices 
do change their ideology during their tenure, other explanations must be sought. 
 The political adjustment hypothesis is much more direct, as it posits that justices 
are strategically changing or tweaking their votes in order to appease the public and the 
two elected branches of the government that must respond to the public.  This hypothesis 
falls within a rational choice model of decision making, as opposed to an attitudinal 
model.  As Epstein and Knight write, rational choice means that justices are considering 
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their actions amongst other actors, including Congress, the president, the public, and their 
colleagues, and how these actors might act or react (1998).  Political adjustment suggests 
that justices are concerned with the enforcement of their decisions, and is best summed 
up by Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr.  He wrote “The Court’s authority – possessed 
of neither the purse nor the sword – ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its 
moral sanction” (1962, quoted in Mishler & Sheehan, 1996; p 173).1 Political adjustment 
could also be phrased as the “running scared hypothesis,” since justices are theoretically 
looking over their shoulders in fear that too many decisions out of line with public 
opinion will result in a loss of power for the Court to the ultimate detriment of 
constitutional democracy. 
 The last of the three theories, the “attitude change hypothesis” fills the gap left by 
the attitudinal model in that it specifically theorizes that a justice’s personal ideology 
might change in time to fit with broad and enduring changes in public opinion.  Judges, 
like any other person in society, are affected by societal norms, even if they are unaware 
of society’s effects on them.  As Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo eloquently 
phrased it, “[t]he great tides and current which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in 
their course and pass the judge by” (quoted in Casillas, Enns & Wohlfarth 2008; p 3).  
Theories of Measures 
Analysis of the Court’s relationship with public mood is best approached by using 
James Stimson’s public mood index as an independent variable.  His public mood index 
is a composition of public opinion on a range of issues, and is relied on by nearly every 
study of this kind (Giles, Blackstone & Vining, 2008; Casillas, Enns & Wohlfarth, 2008; 
                                                 
1
 This statement of Frankfurter’s contradicted a statement he made nearly twenty years earlier in his dissent 
in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette. Then, he wrote “The [Supreme] Court has no reason for 
existence if it merely reflects the pressures of the day” (quoted in Giles, Blackstone, Vining, 2008). 
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Mishler & Sheehan 1993, 1994, 1996; Norpoth & Segal 1994; McGuire & Stimson 2004; 
McGuire, Smith & Caldeira, 2004).  Stimson’s public mood index has two dimensions, 
but like previous studies, only the first dimension will be used as it is shown to be the 
best indication of the issues examined in this study (Stimson, 1991; Erikson, Mackuen & 
Stimson, 2002). With public mood as an independent variable, a dependable measure of 
the Court’s mood is required for a dependent variable.  On this note McGuire, Smith and 
Caldeira put forward the theory that reversals provide a more accurate measure of the 
Court’s ideology (2004). 
The reversal hypothesis relies on the idea that lower courts’ decisions “center 
around the Supreme Court’s ideal,” (McGuire, Smith & Caldeira, 2004; p 5), a concept 
put forward by Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994) that states that because lower courts 
are restricted by stare decisis, they make decisions that attempt to reflect policy outlined 
in Supreme Court precedents.  This “vertical stare decisis” causes lower court decisions 
to cluster around the moderate center of the Court’s known preferences.  Potential 
litigants estimate their chances of winning given these known preferences, and decide to 
seek certiorari based on those chances.  If the Supreme Court is perceived as 
conservative, more liberal lower court decisions will be considered too liberal for the 
Court, and more conservative appellants will apply for certiorari.  In other words, there 
would be more conservative petitioners making accurate (and inaccurate) estimates as to 
their likelihood of winning at the Supreme Court level.  These accurate estimates become 
reversals, while the inaccurate estimates become affirmances.  McGuire, Smith, and 
Caldiera write that “as the Court becomes more conservative, there are more liberal 
policies that will be reversed by the justices and fewer conservative lower court decisions 
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that they will reject” ( 2004; p 7).  Thus the reversals, or the accurate estimates, reflect 
where the Court lies ideologically, while the inaccurate estimates portray an incorrect 
image.  Tests of the reversal hypothesis reveal that when using only reversals, the Court 
appears to be liberal through the Warren Court and then more conservative through the 
Burger and Rehnquist courts until Clinton’s appointments brought it back towards a 
moderate center.  Using only affirmances showed close to the opposite, suggesting that 
the Warren years were very conservative years for the Court, something widely known to 
be untrue.  The reversal model also explains 82% of the variance in the ideological 
composition of decisions, where the standard model using both reversals and affirmances 
only accounted for 70% (McGuire, Smith, & Caldiera, 2004).   
McGuire and Stimson (2004) also test the reversal hypothesis.  Their data support 
their hypothesis, showing affirmances with an R squared of .03, reversals with .60 and all 
cases with .57.  The most compelling results of their research show significantly 
strengthened relationships between court composition/public opinion and the liberalism 
of court outcomes when using reversals as opposed to all the cases.  Given the reversal 
hypothesis, there is a strong argument that using both affirmances and reversals 
contaminates models attempting to illustrate the liberalism of Supreme Court decisions 
and that previous studies of the Court may have underestimated the effect of public 
opinion (McGuire, Smith & Caldiera 2004:16-17). 
There is also an issue with the response time of the Court to public opinion.  
There are several theories about when a relationship between public opinion and Court 
decisions is likely to be observed.  Mishler and Sheehan (1993) predict a lag in the 
evidence of a response to public opinion in the Court’s decisions because replacing 
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justices takes time, as does attitude change.  According to their theory, justices would 
only logically respond to enduring shifts of public opinion.  Norpoth and Segal criticize 
the lag theory, stating that “if the Court only acts on change that has endured, their 
decisions should be influenced by contemporaneous as well as lagged public opinion” 
(1994; p 712).   In reply, Mishler and Sheehan argue that justices may only respond to 
durable shifts in public opinion, something that contemporaneous opinion has not had 
time to prove yet.  They expand their theory to explain a small impact of public opinion 
in the first year that will “gradually increase over time before ending or leveling off at 
some impossible-to-predict future point” (1994; p 718). Their results support this theory, 
but they also failed to control for reversals, so their results are arguably inaccurate.   
Giles, Blackstone, and Vining weigh in with a theory that seeks to explain the 
meaning of the lag, or lack thereof.  They argue that if justices are acting strategically in 
line with the political adjustment hypothesis, their votes will correlate with public 
opinion in real-time, since “it is to current public opinion that they must attend” if they 
want their decisions to be enforced (2008; p 296). However, if justices’ attitudes are 
slowly changing, Giles et al. contend that justices’ votes will correlate at a time lag as 
well.  Epstein et al. argue that elites take a longer time to be swayed in their attitudes 
(1998), thus we can expect to see a time lag anywhere between one and five years if 
attitude change is the explanation behind the justices’ votes. In line with Norpoth and 
Segal, Giles et al. also suggest that “a linkage without a time lag is consistent with both 
explanations,” in that attitude change will also be affected by contemporaneous public 
opinion in addition to a lagged measure (2008). 
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The literature is contested when it comes to controlling for the issue area of the 
law that is the subject of the Supreme Court’s cases.  Some are content to conclude that 
“for time series analysis, combining issue areas is theoretically appropriate,” under the 
assumption that a single liberal-conservative dimension would capture the votes 
accurately regardless of the issue area (Casillas, Enns & Wohlfarth 2008; p 12).  Others 
are concerned that dividing the votes by issue area would limit the sample size of cases 
needed to calculate a liberalism score too much.  Both of these points, while valid, fail to 
provide the clearest picture of justices’ voting patterns.  By aggregating issue areas, an 
analysis would fail to distinguish if a certain kind of case was more prevalent on a 
specific year’s docket than another kind of law case.  This study shows that justices do 
vote differently, even if only slightly, depending on the issue at hand.  For example, if a 
justice voted conservatively on civil liberties cases but slightly liberal on economic cases, 
a year with a docket dominated by economic cases would surely provide an inaccurate 
portrayal of the justice’s voting patterns.  Controlling for issue area solves this problem. 
Individual Justice Theories 
Of course, the Court is not a singular entity, but rather an institution made up of 
nine experienced and intellectual justices.  To analyze the Court’s response to public 
opinion exclusively at the macro level is a failure to examine why the Court is following 
public opinion.  To answer this question, the Court must be examined at an individual 
level.  Mishler and Sheehan take on this task, looking at Supreme Court justices in a 
psychological manner and reasoning that attitudes are affected by both personally held 
beliefs, the strength of those beliefs, how they are expected to behave, and societal norms 
(1996).  Their hypothesis is that justices with more extreme ideologies will be less likely 
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to move to the center (public opinion), while justices who are already moderate will be 
more likely to move one way or the other.  They use yearly data from the Supreme Court 
Data Base from 1953 – 1992, analyzing only justices who served for 12 years or longer.  
Evaluating the percentage of liberal votes cast by each justice each year, they compare it 
to Stimson’s public mood index from 1991.  Their analysis supports their hypothesis, 
showing “that moderate justices are more consistently responsive to fluctuations in the 
public mood than either liberal or conservative justices” (1996; p 189). 
The Public’s Response to the Court 
 
 In explaining any theory that Supreme Court justices are “running scared,” or 
acting strategically, the public’s opinion of the Court is very important.  It would be an 
excellent reason for justices to adhere to public opinion if the Court lost legitimacy every 
time it strayed from the prevailing public mood.  Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (April 
2003) analyze the public’s confidence in the Court,2 and their loyalty to the institution 
(whether they would do away with it or not), along with the public’s satisfaction with 
specific policies, and their general satisfaction with policy.  They conclude that even 
people with low confidence in the Court are still unwilling to do away with it, and that 
“low levels of confidence should certainly not be interpreted as indicators of low 
institutional legitimacy” (Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, April 2003; p 361).  They point to 
the fact that an overwhelming majority of people with low confidence in the Court say 
they will still obey Court decisions even when they disagree, but suggest that their survey 
results could have been influenced by a “heightened awareness” of the Court (their 
survey was conducted shortly after the 2001 decision of Bush v. Gore).    
                                                 
2
 Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence argue that measuring confidence in the Supreme Court is superior to asking 
the public’s confidence in the people running the Supreme Court due to the latter’s lack of specificity. 
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In a different study, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence focus specifically on Bush v. 
Gore, and find that the impact of unpopular decisions amongst the public is softened by 
the Court’s institutional legitimacy  (October 2003).  They further suggest that increased 
knowledge of the Court makes people more likely to support it as an institution, and that 
increased case salience exposes people to the “legitimizing symbols” of the rule of law.  
By providing a juxtaposition of Court deliberation with the partisan fighting that occurred 
in the election, the attraction of national attention actually bolstered institutional support 
for the Court in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore (Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, October 
2003).   It is possible that controversial decisions have a compromising effect on these 
types of studies, because displeased Democrats are canceled out by pleased Republicans. 
But when controlling for partisanship, Gibson, Caldeira and Spence point out that 
Democrats’ support for the court did not decline between 1987 and 2001, even as 
Republicans and Independents’ support increased. 
Giles, Blackstone, and Vining (2008) analyze the effect of case salience on 
specific justices.  They identify a case as salient to the public if it appeared on the front 
page of the New York Times.  They conclude that public mood does not hold any 
additional sway over the Court for salient cases than for non-salient cases. 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
This study seeks to explain the reason behind the Court’s apparent adherence to 
public mood.  To examine this, I adopt Mishler and Sheehan’s hypothesis that moderate 
justices are more likely to be swayed by public mood and are the reason for the overall 
Court’s adherence to public mood.3  To determine the cause of adherence, I assume the 
                                                 
3
 Moderate justices are qualified as such if their average liberalism score during their tenure falls between 
40 and 60 percent. 
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hypothesis of Giles, Blackstone and Vining (2008).  If the Court is operating within the 
political adjustment hypothesis, it will respond to public mood in real-time, along with 
the individual justices.  If justices are being affected by “the great tides and current which 
engulf the rest of men,” i.e. the attitude change hypothesis, then they will correlate with 
public mood at a time lag and possibly in real-time.  Finally, I will take a brief look at the 
public’s reaction to the Supreme Court.  Given the findings of Gibson, Caldeira and 
Spence (April & October 2003), I assert that public confidence will not change 
significantly over time in reaction to Court decisions, and that any change that does not 
indicate a loss in the institutional legitimacy of the Court.  Therefore, the reaction of the 
public should be a far concern for justices operating under the political adjustment 
hypothesis. 
In examining the level of public confidence in the Court, data was only available 
from 1973 to 2005.4  The results are displayed in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
4
 Data obtained from the Roper Center using primarily Gallup, with Harris Poll and General Social Survey 
filling in the where Gallup data was not available.  The question wording was: “Now I am going to read 
you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in 
each one--a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little? The U.S. (United States) Supreme Court.”  All 
questions were verbatim or the logical equivalent. 
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It is noteworthy that the level of respondents answering “Some” confidence in the 
Court increases at a steady rate, while the number of those answering “None/very little” 
decreases.  The other two levels of confidence, “Quite a lot” and “A great deal,” fluctuate 
slightly, but overall, the public shows no discernable reaction to the Court’s various 
decisions, salient or otherwise, between 1973 and 2005.  It appears that the Court 
maintains a high level of confidence.  Noting that the majority of respondents answer 
“Some” or “A great deal” consistently, and that the Court enjoys an extremely high level 
of institutional legitimacy regardless of the level of confidence that people have in it 
(Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, April 2003), this study does not analyze the public’s 
reaction to Court decisions, instead concluding that the Court has little reason to fear a 
loss of legitimacy in the public’s eyes. 
Data and Methods 
I examine twenty-two justices between 1953 and 2005 using data from the 
Supreme Court Database5.  Justices Fortas, Goldberg, Whittaker, Minton, Vinson, 
Burton, Jackson, and Reed are excluded from the analysis due to their short tenures of 
less than seven years after 1953.  Because the models for Felix Frankfurter, William 
Douglas, Antonin Scalia, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg6 are insignificant in real-time and at 
all time lags tested, the four justices’ results are not reported in the study.  The designs 
for the models used in this analysis are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
                                                 
5
 Harold Spaeth’s Supreme Court Database is available online at http://scdb.wustl.edu/ 
6
 The model for Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the issue area of Criminal Procedure is significant in T+2, but the 
lack of other issue areas for comparison and the very small number of years to consider render the results 
unworthy of discussion. 
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*Indicates controlling party 
†Separated by issue 
 
To create a dependent variable that can be measured against public mood, 
liberalism scores are calculated for each justice by dividing the total liberal votes in a 
term by the total votes overall to create a percentage of liberalism that is measured on a 1 
to 100 scale.  The cases in which the Court reversed the decision of the lower Court are 
used to calculate the liberalism scores, because reversals provide a better indicator of 
each justice’s mood (McGuire, Smith & Caldeira, 2004).  The dependent variable is 
measuring individual justice voting behavior is identified as “Justice Liberalism” for each 
particular issue area. 
To provide the most accurate measure of a justice’s voting behavior, cases are 
separated by law issue.  In line with McGuire and Stimson (2004), cases are separated 
into three distinct categories for each justice.  “Criminal Procedure” cases are in their 
own category. “Civil Rights,” “First Amendment,” “Due Process,” and “Privacy” are 
combined into the category of “Civil Liberties.”  “Unions” and “Economics” are 
combined into “Economic Activity.” 
Figure 2 – Court Mood Model 
 
Public Mood 
 
House of Rep.* 
    Court Mood† 
Senate* 
 
President* 
 
Figure 3 – Individual Justice Model 
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 Public Mood   Justice 
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 House of Rep.*   
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The Supreme Court Database provides the ideological direction of each justice’s 
vote, and cases in which an ideological direction was not discernable are discarded.  
Cases categorized as judicial power, attorneys, federalism, interstate relations, and federal 
taxation are not used due to the complexity of coding the ideological direction of votes on 
these law issue areas.  The database codes votes and decisions as liberal if, in criminal 
procedure, First Amendment, civil rights or due process cases, the vote is pro-individual, 
pro-affirmative action, pro-female in abortion, or pro-civil liberties, to name a few.  In 
economics or union cases, liberal votes and decisions are pro-union, pro-debtor, anti-
business, or pro-consumer, etc.  Conservative votes and decisions are coded as the 
opposites of the liberal votes.  Exact lists of coding criteria are found in the Supreme 
Court Database codebook. 
It is still reasonable to assume that justices vote with an ideology, and are mindful 
of how they have voted on past cases of a similar nature.  While the attitudinal model is 
incorrect in assuming that this ideology stays constant, it would be a mistake to discard 
the concept of ideology altogether.  Therefore, I developed a measure of ideology that 
captures the average liberalism of the individual justice from the previous three years for 
each issue area.  The variable known as “Ideology” will be measured on a 1 to 100 scale.  
“Ideology” is different than the dependent variable of justice liberalism in that it 
measures the average liberalism of votes over the previous three years, while the 
dependent variable of “Justice Liberalism” is a measure of the liberalism of votes for the 
current year in question.  An average of three years is used because it is long enough to 
balance out the single years that might be considered an anomaly and short enough that it 
is still reasonable that a justice’s previous votes in that issue are in mind.  If justices are 
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expected to maintain a specific ideology, this variable will remain relatively constant and 
correlate well with each justice’s liberalism scores throughout their tenure.  However, if 
other factors are at play, the impact of ideology will be lessened. 
Dummy variables are introduced to test for the effect of the party controlling the 
United States Senate, House of Representatives, and the party that controlled the 
Presidency.  These three variables are measured as either Republican (0) or Democrat (1).  
These provide indirect measures of the public mood in the form of the elected 
representatives.  These variables are not lagged, because there is no reasonable 
expectation that the Court would respond to the Senate, House, or Presidency control 
during the year before its own ruling.  Because the variable for the House of 
Representatives stays constant between 1953 and 1994, the variable drops out of the 
models for all but the most recent justices. 
The variable of public mood, however, is lagged for some models.  Models are 
run measuring real-time response as well as response to public mood that was lagged 
from one to five years.  “T+1” refers to the time series model where the 1974 public 
mood was matched up with the 1975 Court and justice liberalism.  “T+2” refers to 1973 
public mood matched to the 1975 Court and justice liberalism, and so on.  Six models are 
run (one for real-time and five for the time lags) with the dependent variable of Court 
Mood to determine the likely source of individual justices adhering to public mood.  
Court Mood is calculated in the same way as justice liberalism, and is measured on a 1 to 
100 scale.  The results are shown in Tables 1 – 3.  The trend that appeared was a strong 
adherence to public mood in Realtime that diminishes as the time lags increase, losing 
value both in the R-square of the overall model and in the significance of each issue area.  
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For this reason, T+3 through T+5 are not included.  The data tables showing the results 
for individual justices from real-time through T+2 are located in Appendices A – C.  
Table 4 shows the number of significant B coefficients and their level of correlation for 
each variable.  Court Mood was the most significant variable throughout, as well as the 
strongest. 
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Table 2 - Court Mood  T+1 
Issue 
Criminal 
Procedure 
Civil 
Liberties 
Economic 
Activity 
Model and 
Independent 
Variables  
   
 N 
50 51 45 
Adjusted R-
Square  
.310 .356 .195 
Overall 
Model Sig. 
.000*** .000*** .012** 
Public Mood  
(Std. Error) 
2.811** 
(.836) 
3.598*** 
(.856) 
1.746* 
(.809) 
House of 
Rep. (Std. 
Error) 
5.564 
(8.779) 
13.803 
(9.514) 
8.925 
(11.957) 
Senate (Std. 
Error) 
.061 
(8.885) 
-5.146 
(9.257) 
1.984 
(9.574) 
President 
(Std. Error) 
12.118 
(6.402) 
9.399 
(6.723) 
10.458 
(7.090) 
Table 1 - Court Mood Real-time 
Issue 
Criminal 
Procedure 
Civil 
Liberties 
Economic 
Activity 
Model and 
Independent 
Variables  
   
 N 
50 51 45 
Adjusted R-
Square  
.413 .420 .320 
Overall 
Model Sig. 
.000*** .000*** .001***. 
Public Mood  
(Std. Error) 
3.354*** 
(.729) 
3.851*** 
(.774) 
2.622*** 
(.731) 
House of 
Rep. (Std. 
Error) 
4.135 
(8.099) 
13.484 
(9.029) 
9.748 
(10.993) 
Senate (Std. 
Error) 
1.473 
(7.635) 
-.372 
(8.486) 
-.674 
(8.429) 
President 
(Std. Error) 
13.898*◊ 
(5.848) 
12.178 
(6.315) 
12.237 
(6.454) 
Table 3 - Court Mood T+2 
Issue 
Criminal 
Procedure 
Civil 
Liberties 
Economic 
Activity 
Model and 
Independent 
Variables  
   
 N 
50 51 45 
Adjusted R-
Square  
.180 .256 .101 
Overall 
Model Sig. 
.012** .001*** .086† 
Public Mood  
(Std. Error) 
1.374 
(.933) 
2.854** 
(.945) 
† 
House of 
Rep. (Std. 
Error) 
4.512 
(9.883) 
16.387 
(10.238) 
† 
Senate (Std. 
Error) 
8.662 
(10.342) 
-4.700 
(10.524) 
† 
President 
(Std. Error) 
12.489 
(7.292) 
6.753 
(7.500) 
† 
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
†Multiple Regression model 
insignificant  
 
‡ Variable B coefficients measured 
with linear regression; Standard 
Error measured with F-Test. 
 
◊When the President is a Democrat 
(i.e. one unit increase in the dummy 
variable), we expect a 13.898 point 
increase in Court liberalism 
Court mood, Ideology, and Public Mood are 
measured on a 1 to 100 scale 
 
House of Representatives, Senate, and President 
are measured on a 0 to 1 scale. 
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Table 4 - Number of Significant B Coefficients for  
Individual Justices and Level of Correlation 
 
 Level of Correlation 
  Negative Weak Moderate Strong 
R
ea
l-t
im
e 
Court Mood 0 2 12 15 
Ideology 6 0 2 3 
Public Mood 3 0 0 5 
House of Rep 1 1 0 0 
Senate 1 4 0 0 
President 0 3 1 0 
T+
1 
Court Mood 0 1 18 16 
Ideology 4 0 4 3 
Public Mood 1 0 0 4 
House of Rep 0 0 0 0 
Senate 1 2 0 0 
President 1 4 1 0 
T+
2 
Court Mood 0 1 14 16 
Ideology 2 0 2 3 
Public Mood 1 0 0 4 
House of Rep 0 0 0 0 
Senate 1 1 0 0 
President 0 4 0 0 
“Negative” denotes negative correlation 
“Weak” denotes correlation of less than 30% of unit size 
“Moderate” denotes correlation of less than 75% of unit size 
“Strong” denotes correlation of 75% of unit size or higher 
Example: B coefficient of .478 for Court Mood indicates that justice liberalism 
would go up 47.8% of a single unit (liberalism of 50 would go up to 50.478). 
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Data Analysis 
Real-time 
According to the results of the real-time model, only a few justices appear to be 
following public opinion.  Four justices, (Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Kennedy) 
correlate positively with public mood with moderate strength, but only in specific issue 
areas.  Justice Blackmun is by far the most interesting in the results of this study, as he 
responds to the variables of Public Mood, Court Mood, and President for Criminal 
Procedure  and Economic Activity, and Ideology for Criminal Procedure and Civil 
Liberties.  For every one unit increase in the public mood of the nation, Justice 
Blackmun’s liberalism increases by 3.6 units in Criminal Procedure, and 3.2 units in 
Economic Activity.  His dramatic shift from conservative to liberal during his tenure can, 
in part, be attributed to the public mood of the nation.  Within the issue of Economic 
Activity, Justice Kennedy displays a similar adherence, correlating most strongly with 
Court mood, but also strongly with Public Mood.  With every unit increase in public 
mood in Economic Activity, Justice Kennedy’s liberalism increases by four units.  He 
also responds significantly to the parties controlling the Senate and Presidency, again 
suggesting that at least within the issue of Economic Activity, he is also a very responsive 
justice.   
Even though the fact that any of the justices can be found to be correlating with 
public mood at the individual level is noteworthy, the variance of the issue areas and the 
lack of a common characteristic between these justices suggest that this result is nothing 
more than a product of their uniqueness as an individual.  All of the justices who 
correlate positively with public opinion do not qualify as moderate in the issue area in 
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question.7  The failure of moderate justices to strongly or consistently correlate with 
public mood does not allow Mishler and Sheehan’s hypothesis to be confirmed. 
Ideology is only positively correlated with four of the justices, Black, Blackmun, 
O’Connor, and Kennedy, and only in specific issue areas.   The failure of ideology to 
explain a lot of the variance of most of the justices’ voting patterns, along with the 
corresponding strength of other variables, suggests that ideology is not the dominating 
factor in many of the justices’ decisions and that many of them are making decisions 
more in line with a rational choice model. 
Court mood is the dominant variable in all of the justices’ voting patterns in real-
time.  The variable measuring the liberalism of the decisions of the Court has weak to 
heavy levels of correlation for all of the justices in at least one issue area.  For eleven of 
the justices, Court mood was significant in all of the issue areas tested with significant 
models.  That justices are responding most significantly to their colleagues is no surprise.  
The insulated environment of the Court encourages this, but because Court mood factors 
in so heavily, these results favor the rational choice model.   Justices, rather than being 
overly concerned with how they have voted on similar issues in the past, are most 
responsive to the current direction of the Court and their vote as it fits within that 
framework.  It is expected that each justice would correlate at a weak to moderate level 
considering that they are one of the nine members of the Court, but the R-squared for 
each model confirms that much more than one ninth of the variance is being explained.  
Furthermore, an individual justice does not always vote with the majority, and yet several 
justices correlate at a level higher than a one to one correlation: Warren in Criminal 
                                                 
7
 Justice Blackmun did qualify as moderate in the issue area of Economic Activity, and averaged 39% in 
Criminal Procedure, but Blackmun is an exception because of his dramatic swing in voting behavior. 
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Procedure, Powell and O’Connor in Civil Liberties, and Stewart, Burger, and Kennedy in 
Economic Activity.  With so much of the variance being explained, it is surprising that 
Court mood is often the largest correlation in the models for each individual justice’s 
voting behavior across issue areas. 
The variables for the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Presidency did 
not display any trend across the justices.  Instead, they correlated weakly with only a few 
different justices only in specific issue areas and with high standard errors at times.  Like 
the results for ideology, these results are indicative of the individuality of justices, but 
unlike ideology, this points away from a rational choice model, but only somewhat.  The 
failure of these variables to explain a large degree of variance across justices does not 
rule out the rational choice model, but rather merely suggests that the House, Senate, and 
Presidency are not the institutions with which the justices are most concerned.  Of note 
are the weak correlations with the variable for the party control of the Presidency for 
three of the Justices: Clark and Kennedy (Economic Activity), and Blackmun (Criminal 
Procedure and Economic Activity). 
T+1  
 The time lag is used to test for attitude change that might occur slowly among the 
justices.  Because they are intellectual elites and thus might take a longer time to be 
affected by societal shifts in mood (Epstein et al., 1998), testing for adherence to public 
mood at a time lag should show if justice voting behavior fits within the attitude change 
hypothesis. 
Only Justices Blackmun in Criminal Procedure and Economic Activity, Stevens 
in Criminal Procedure, and Breyer in Civil Liberties correlate positively with public 
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mood, and all do so at quite a strong level of correlation.  However, only Breyer qualifies 
as voting within the moderate range in Civil Liberties.  Once again, the results confirm 
that any consistent individual adherence to public mood across justices is non-existent.  
This time, at a time lag of one year, moderate justices are unlikely to be the source of the 
Court’s adherence to public mood. 
 The variable for Court mood is dominant in explaining the variance of justice’s 
votes in this time lag.  It accounts for variance across issue areas, and does so again with 
weak to strong levels of correlation.  Very similar to the real-time models, this suggests 
that the overall Court’s direction is foremost in the mind of the justices. 
 In T+1, ideology displays positive influence for only six justices, and only in 
specific issue areas and without a particular pattern across justices.  The same can be said 
for the dummy variables of the House, Senate, and Presidency. 
 Justice Blackmun stands out again, correlating with all variables except the House 
(which was constant), the Senate, and Public Mood in Civil Liberties.  Continuing as an 
example of attitude change, Justice Blackmun gives a unique example of an ultra-
responsive justice on the Supreme Court. 
 Once again though, no distinguishable pattern appears of justices, moderate or 
otherwise, who individually correlate with public mood, even at a time lag of one year.  
With Court mood again as the dominate factor in this decision making model, a clearer 
picture begins to form of what is not driving most of these justices, and that is public 
mood. 
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T+2 
 The same story plays out over the T+2 model, with Court mood as a dominate 
factor in most of the justices, and public mood registering with Brennan, Blackmun, 
Rehnquist, and Stevens in specific issue areas.  Ideology fails to correlate with the 
liberalism of most of the justices, as do the variables of the House, Senate, and 
Presidency.  With the T+2 model, the picture becomes hazier for each justice, with issue 
areas dropping out due to their insignificance. 
Conclusions 
 The models in this study explain from 37% to 94% of the variance across the 
justices, with the bulk of them explaining 60% or more.  There is still some question as to 
what influences justices, but this model does a good job at explaining a lot of variance 
within such a secretive institution.  Short of interviewing the justices, this study 
attempted to create an accurate picture of what is driving each justice, but it does have its 
shortcomings. 
 By dividing the issue areas and using only reversals to calculate liberalism scores, 
this study achieved a degree of accuracy that other studies have failed to do so far. 
However, the methods used here limited the sample size of cases.  In an attempt to be 
more accurate, it is possible that there is still some noise in the data that only a case-
specific study could reduce. 
 Another limit that plagues these kinds of time series studies is the small number 
of years that justices spend on the Court.  As a result, the N in many of the models is very 
small.  This study makes up for that in part by achieving a high degree of accuracy in the 
variable for each justice’s liberalism, but it would certainly be easier to see trends 
Supreme Court Responsiveness 
 
24 
 
develop if each justice stayed for thirty or more years.  Nonetheless, this study achieved 
significance in the majority of the models. 
 The results of the individual justice models indicate that Court mood is a 
dominant, even with public mood at a time lag.  However, the results of the Court models 
show that public mood has a strong effect in real-time that fades as time goes on.  If few 
of the justices are correlating with public mood, but the overall Court is, and the Court’s 
mood is the biggest factor in the justice’s decision making, it is very possible that the 
justices only combine in the aggregate to follow public mood.   
The Court models suggest attitude change rather than political adjustment because 
of the time lag results.  Political adjustment is still a possibility, but several factors work 
against it.  The salience of cases has no effect on the Court’s adherence to public mood 
(Giles, Blackstone, & Vining, 2008).   This study showed that public confidence remains 
high, and the Court even enjoys institutional legitimacy among those with low confidence 
in the Court (Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, April 2003).  This study also showed that the 
other institutions of government have little to no effect on the Court, or on many of the 
individual justices.  All of these factors suggest that the justices do not need to politically 
adjust to the public.  Even if the justices need to strategically position themselves 
amongst the other institutions of government for their decisions to be enforced, many of 
them are not doing so, and the Court is not responding as an institution. 
There is room to discuss if the justices who are affected by public mood can be 
said to be numerous enough or in strategic enough positions to be the cause of the Court’s 
adherence to public mood.  The best alternative explanation is that there is a small 
amount of attitude change among most of the justices, and the subsequent strategic 
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positioning of their votes within their own institution (Court mood) causes them to decide 
in line with public opinion regularly.  As mentioned, the power of aggregation has a very 
likely role in the Court’s adherence to public mood. 
These are the findings of this study.  There is still room for further exploration of 
this subject, but the results here go farther than previous research, mostly due to the 
greater accuracy of the measures used.  It is my hope that more exploration will be done, 
as these studies have enormous implications for the constitutional democracy of the 
United States.  This study has shown that most individual justices are not influenced by 
the masses, preserving in part the counter-majoritarian nature of the Court.  This research 
has also revealed that on average, the justices are not concerned with the controlling 
political parties of the other institutions of government, nor is the Court as a whole.  The 
most important factor in the justices’ votes is the overall Court’s behavior, and it is within 
this context that further research can explain the Court’s relationship with public mood. 
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